CAT/C/71/D/913/2019
sections 18 and 19, of the Aliens Act, citing impediments to enforcement. The complainants
cited the same circumstances that had already been examined during the asylum proceedings
but submitted documents in Russian which were alleged to be summonses to the police. The
Swedish Migration Agency decided, on 14 June 2012, not to grant the complainants residence
permits or a new examination of their cited grounds for protection. In its decision, the Agency
noted that the documents submitted were of a simple nature. Moreover, since the
complainants’ cited need for protection had already been examined by the Swedish
authorities, the documentation was not deemed to constitute a lasting impediment to the
enforcement of the complainants’ expulsion order. The decision was appealed to the
Migration Court, which, on 27 July 2012, rejected the appeal. The complainants did not
appeal the Court’s judgment.
4.3
On 14 December 2012, the complainants’ case was handed over to the Swedish Police
Authority for enforcement, given that the complainants had not complied with their expulsion
order. However, instead of travelling back to their country of origin, the complainants went
into hiding.
4.4
On 2 July 2013, the complainants submitted another application for residence permits,
or a re-examination of the issue of residence permits. They cited the same circumstances and
submitted the same written documentation that had previously been examined. On 12 July
2013, the Swedish Migration Agency refused to grant the complainants residence permits.
The complainants did not appeal the decision.
4.5
On 18 July 2014, the complainants submitted another application for residence
permits, or a re-examination. In addition to their previous claims, they submitted a translation
of an alleged summons to a questioning at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Ingushetia. The
Swedish Migration Agency decided, on 21 November 2014, not to grant the complainants
residence permits. In its decision, the Agency noted that no new circumstances had emerged
regarding the cited need for protection that could be assumed to constitute a lasting
impediment to enforcement of the expulsion order. The complainants did not appeal the
decision.
4.6
The State party does not contest the fact that all available domestic remedies have
been exhausted in the present case, with regard to the complainants’ applications for asylum.
However, the complainants have not exhausted the domestic remedies with regard to any of
their applications for a residence permit, or a re-examination of the issue of residence permits.
4.7
Furthermore, the State party notes that the complainants have submitted a vast
quantity of written evidence that has not been submitted to or scrutinized by the Swedish
migration authorities. Some of those documents also disclose entirely new information that
has not been cited before the domestic authorities. It is therefore evident that the complainants
have not exhausted all domestic remedies with regard to that new evidence. In the light of
the above, the State party holds that the communication should be declared inadmissible for
failure to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the new evidence submitted.
4.8
The State party maintains that the complainants’ assertion that they are at risk of being
treated in a manner contrary to article 3 of the Convention if returned to the Russian
Federation fails to rise to the minimum level of substantiation required for the purposes of
admissibility. The State party accordingly submits that the communication is manifestly
unfounded and therefore inadmissible pursuant to article 22 (2) of the Convention and rule
113 (b) of the Committee’s rules of procedure.
4.9
The State party recalls that, when determining whether there are substantial grounds
for believing that the forced return of a person to another State would expose the person to
such a danger of torture as to constitute a violation of article 3, the Committee must take into
account all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights in that country. However, as the Committee has
repeatedly emphasized, the aim of such a determination is to establish whether the individual
concerned would personally be at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in
the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such
constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be at risk of being
subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country. For a violation of article 3 to be
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