CCPR/C/123/D/2785/2016
court that would cast any doubt on Mr. Humaam’s criminal responsibility. This matter was
fully and comprehensively investigated, and the proceedings were carried out in accordance
with the highest investigative standards. The authorities complied fully at all stages of the
investigation with their professional duties of disclosure. Accordingly, these allegations
have not been substantiated.
4.6
The State party further objects that, under rule 96 (b) of the Committee’s rules of
procedure, a petition is ordinarily to be submitted by the victim or his or her appointed
representative. In this case, no evidence has been adduced or explanation given as to why
the communication could not be submitted by Mr. Humaam himself or by his appointed
representative. The fact that Mr. Humaam is a serving prisoner does not make him unable
to submit the communication or prevent it from being submitted by an appointed
representative. The State party accordingly asserts that the communication should be
dismissed as inadmissible.
Author’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility
5.1
On 13 November 2016, the author submitted his comments on the State party’s
observations on admissibility.
5.2
The author states that the same matter is not being considered by another
international procedure of investigation or settlement within the meaning of article 5 (2) (a)
of the Optional Protocol. The Committee has already concluded that extra-conventional
procedures established by the Human Rights Council do not generally constitute such an
investigation or settlement.3 In addition, the petition to the special procedures was prepared
by a human rights organization and not by the victim or his family.
5.3
Regarding the exhaustion of domestic remedies, such remedies must be effective,
while the existing procedures in Maldives do not guarantee the meaningful exercise of the
right to seek a pardon for the purposes of article 6 (4) of the Covenant or the fair trial
guarantees under article 14 of the Covenant.
5.4
The adoption in 2014 of Regulation 2014/R-33 on the Investigation of Murder and
Implementation of the Death Penalty revoked the presidential power to grant pardons to or
reduce the sentences of persons convicted of intentional murder who have no further right
of appeal.4 Under section 13 of Regulation R-33, the heirs of a murder victim have the
discretion to pardon the person facing execution. If the pardon is granted, the sentence still
can be commuted only if the Supreme Court does not issue an order to the contrary. During
the Supreme Court appeal process, the court’s registrar refused to accept a letter submitted
by Mr. Ali’s family requesting a reprieve for Mr. Humaam until a proper murder
investigation had been completed. 5 Furthermore, although the Supreme Court issued its
final decision on 24 June 2016, the State party has failed to facilitate the mediation process
pursuant to article 9 of Regulation R-33. The State party did not ensure that the mediation
process would be completed without unreasonable delay after the death penalty was
imposed (five months having elapsed at the time the State party’s observations were
submitted).6 The Regulation also does not clearly state the process by which the Supreme
Court may refuse to commute the death sentence in cases where the victim’s family
pardons the convicted person. The process also discriminates on the basis of the offence
committed, 7 since the High Court held in December 2015 that the President could not
commute a death sentence or pardon a defendant who was accused of first-degree murder.
3
4
5
6
7
4
See, for example, Shikhmuradova v. Turkmenistan (CCPR/C/112/D/2069/2011) and Djebrouni and
Berzig v. Algeria (CCPR/C/103/D/1781/2008).
As guaranteed under article 115 (s) of the Constitution.
Letter not provided.
In this connection, the author refers to the comment by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions that, in cases where the diyah pardon is available, it must be
supplemented by a separate, public system for seeking an official pardon or commutation, or else
“international law will be violated” (see A/61/311, para. 61).
See High Court of Maldives Judgment No. 2012-dm-08 (December 2015), accessible at
www.highcourt.gov.mv/dhi/mediamanager/2012-dm-08.pdf.