CCPR/C/123/D/2575/2015 remain there and to be treated in accordance with recognized basic human rights standards until a durable solution is found for them”. 7 Supporting her claim with a report on the situation of refugees in Italy, the author alleges that the Italian system of reception of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection does not comply with basic human rights standards.8 She further relies on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,9 considering that the State party has failed to ensure that she would not face a real risk of being exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment if returned to Italy. Further information submitted by the author 4.1 On 8 July 2016, the author informed the Committee that her Italian residence permit had expired. 4.2 In order to further substantiate her claim, the author invokes the Committee’s general comments No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (para. 9) and No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant (para. 12) to recall that States parties should not deport individuals to third countries where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. She submits that a State party may be in violation of the Covenant where it “takes a decision relating to a person within its jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that that person’s rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction”.10 4.3 The author alleges that when determining the risk of a violation of her rights under article 7 of the Covenant if returned to Italy, the State party should have taken into consideration her particular vulnerability. She emphasizes that she is a single mother and that her deportation would significantly affect the life of her child. In that regard, the author refers to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Tarakhel v. Switzerland which reads: “This requirement of ‘special protection’ is particularly important when the persons concerned by the deportation are children, in view of their specific needs and their extreme vulnerability.” 11 In that connection, the author invokes the recent Views of the Committee in Jasin v. Denmark, in which it held that returning a single mother left without shelter or means of subsistence from Denmark to Italy, although she had been granted subsidiary protection there, amounted to a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. 12 4.4 The author maintains that the Italian reception system for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection is insufficient and does not comply with basic human rights standards. According to the reports available, hundreds of migrants, including asylum seekers, live in abandoned buildings in cities such as Rome and have limited access to public services. 13 Owing to the lack of reception facilities and housing, many asylum seekers and refugees in Italy live on the streets and only occasionally receive food or shelter from churches and non-governmental organizations. The author particularly insists on the fact that returnees who have been granted international protection and benefited from the reception system when they first arrived in Italy are not entitled to accommodation in reception centres. The Jesuit Refugee Service, in its annual report for 2013, stated that there was a real problem as regards those who were sent back to Italy and who had already been granted some kind of protection. If someone voluntarily leaves one of the accommodation centres that are available upon arrival before the established time, they are no longer 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 4 The author refers to UNHCR Executive Committee conclusion No. 58 (1989). See Swiss Refugee Council, “Reception conditions in Italy: report on the current situation of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of protection, in particular Dublin returnees” (October 2013). The author refers to the decision of the Court in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (application no. 30696/09), judgment of 21 January 2011. See, for example, Kindler v. Canada (CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991), para. 6.2. Tarakhel v. Switzerland, application no. 29217/12, judgment of 4 November 2014, para. 119. See Jasin v. Denmark, (CCPR/C/114/D/2360/2014), paras. 8.4 and 8.10. See, for example, United States of America, Department of State, “Italy 2013 human rights report”, available at GE.19-07290

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