CCPR/C/123/D/2423/2014
conversion was a means to obtain asylum rather than being genuinely motivated by a new
faith.
The complaint
3.1
The author claims that, if returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran, he risks
persecution both as a former member of the Basij who fled without permission and on
account of his conversion to Christianity. He alleges that he could face detention and torture
during his interrogation for leaving the Basij without permission, and that he could be tried
and sentenced to death for converting to Christianity in violation of sharia law — in
violation of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant.
3.2
The author also claims a violation of articles 13 and 14, read in conjunction with
articles 2 and 26, of the Covenant, on the grounds that he only had access to an
administrative procedure and not to courts. He refers to the response from the Government
of Denmark to the concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, in which the State party justified the denial of access to courts on the
grounds that the Refugee Board was a court-like organ. 1 He also refers to the concern
expressed by that Committee “that decisions by the Refugee Board on asylum requests are
final and may not be appealed before a court” and to the Committee’s recommendation
“that asylum seekers be granted the right to appeal against the Refugee Board’s decisions”.2
3.3 The author reiterates that he officially converted to Christianity in April 2013, that is,
after the decision of the Danish Immigration Service, but before the Danish Refugee
Appeals Board hearing. Therefore, this additional ground for asylum was considered only
by the Refugee Appeals Board, in March 2014. This means that the Refugee Appeals Board
was not an appeal board when considering his conversion, and he was therefore deprived of
an appeal in respect of this issue. In any situation under Danish law, other than for asylum
seekers, such a decision would be subjected to a review on appeal by a higher body or court.
In the author’s case, his fear of persecution on the grounds of having converted from Islam
to Christianity has been assessed by only one “legal body” — the so-called Refugee
Appeals Board.
3.4
The author considers that if the Danish Refugee Appeals Board were indeed an
appeals board, it should have sent the matter back to the Danish Immigration Service in
order for the Immigration Service to assess this new ground for asylum. The inability to
lodge an appeal before the regular courts against the Refugee Board decision therefore
amounts to a violation of articles 2 and 26, read in conjunction with articles 13 and 14, of
the Covenant.
3.5
Finally, the author contends that whether or not he showed an interest in Christianity
before or after the first decision by the Danish Immigration Service cannot be used as a
factor in assessing his religious convictions. Since he was in great personal pain, he sought
help from other sources, a process which is well known to many converts. Therefore, the
majority of the Board members should have not held this against him. Had he wanted to
fake his religious convictions, he could have declared that he was a converted Christian
when entering Denmark. The author therefore asks how one is “allowed” to develop one’s
personal faith without being accused of lying.
State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits
4.1
On 11 December 2014, the State party submitted its observations on the
admissibility and the merits of the communication. It submits that the communication
should be declared inadmissible. Should the Committee declare it admissible, the State
party submits that the Covenant will not be violated if the author is returned to the Islamic
Republic of Iran, and that articles 2, 13, 14 and 26 of the Covenant have not been violated
in connection with the hearing of the author’s asylum case by the Danish authorities.
Moreover, the author’s claim under article 14 is inadmissible ratione materiae.
1
2
See CERD/C/DEN/CO/17/Add.1, para. 12.
See CERD/C/DEN/CO/17, para. 13.
3