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by Act No. 474 of 30 December 2013 as an equivalent to the national preventive
mechanism.
11.
The Subcommittee held meetings with the Service, and the two bodies conducted
joint visits to different places of deprivation of liberty. The Subcommittee noted with
appreciation the Service’s 64 unannounced visits to places of deprivation of liberty since it
entered into operation in July 2016. It also took note of the Service’s multidisciplinary
composition, the gender parity among its staff and other points.
12.
Although it acknowledges the Service’s work, the Subcommittee is seriously
concerned that the Service’s independence is severely compromised by the fact that its legal
status is such that it is attached to the Ministry of Justice. In this regard, the Service does
not meet the requirements of the Optional Protocol. In addition, Act No. 474, which has a
single article, does not clarify key issues regarding the national preventive mechanism, such
as what its mandate and powers are to be, how its members are to be appointed or how it is
to be funded and held to account. These omissions run counter to the fulfilment of the State
party’s obligations under the Optional Protocol.
13.
The Subcommittee notes that gaps in the legal provisions whereby the Service is to
act as the national preventive mechanism have a direct impact on its work, as it is not
perceived as an independent body. For example, the Service uses the logo of the Ministry of
Justice on its documents and, on several occasions, officials of places of deprivation of
liberty and persons deprived of their liberty referred to the Service as a State inspection
agency. In addition, while recognizing the goodwill of the members of the Service, civil
society organizations emphasized how little legitimacy it enjoys and drew attention to its
perceived lack of independence, while also making references to possible conflicts of
interest.
14.
The Subcommittee noted that the Service’s working methods place disproportionate
emphasis on the material conditions of detention rather than on a detailed examination of
allegations of torture and ill-treatment. This emphasis was observed during the joint visits
made to San Pedro Prison and the Miraflores military barracks and was also reflected in the
Service’s internal forms and protocols, which the Subcommittee reviewed. The
Subcommittee is also concerned that during the visit to San Pedro Prison, no confidential
individual interviews with persons deprived of their liberty were held and that the group
interviews were held in the presence of inmate representatives, which could give rise to a
serious risk of reprisals.
15.
The authorities advanced a number of arguments that can be summed up as: “The
Service is better than nothing.” It should be noted that the Subcommittee is not calling for
the dissolution of the Service, which may be a legitimate supplement to State oversight
systems, but its existence should not preclude the establishment of a national preventive
mechanism that is in full compliance with the Optional Protocol.
16.
Recalling that, according to the Optional Protocol, functional independence,
which States parties are bound to guarantee, is the key determinant of the
effectiveness of a national preventive mechanism, the Subcommittee urges the
Bolivian authorities to:
(a)
Designate or set up, by means of a constitutional or legislative
amendment, a national preventive mechanism that enjoys complete financial and
operational autonomy in the performance of its functions;
(b)
Ensure that the new legislation clearly sets forth the national preventive
mechanism’s mandate and powers and includes specific provisions on the
appointment of members, the length of their terms of service, their independence and
the grounds for their dismissal;
(c)
Provide the national preventive mechanism with the resources to
perform its work effectively;
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