CAT/OP/DEU/1
mechanisms monitored places of detention. This, however, does not diminish the
significance of the mandate of the NPM to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
16.
Notwithstanding the willingness of the Federal and State authorities to ensure
compliance with the Optional Protocol, the SPT notes that there are legal, structural and
institutional problems that may jeopardize the efficiency and the institutional credibility of
the NPM as a whole. The authorities will therefore be required to address, for instance,
institutional factors such as the current size, selection and composition of the NPM and its
limited role in terms of commenting on the draft legislation, and in particular, the issue of
adequate budgetary and personnel resources.
17.
The lack of adequate resources for the NPM has been questioned by other
international monitoring mechanisms, including the United Nations Committee against
Torture, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and the European Committee for
the Prevention of Torture.
18.
In accordance with its mandate, as set out in article 11 (b), subparagraphs (ii) and
(iii), the SPT will address a separate confidential report to the NPM of Germany.
III. Main legal, structural and institutional obstacles faced by the
current national preventive mechanism
19.
While the Optional Protocol leaves the decision regarding the institutional format of
the NPM to the State Party, it is imperative that the mechanism be structured and that it
carries out its mandate in accordance with the Optional Protocol, as reflected in the SPT
“Guidelines on national preventive mechanisms”.5
20.
The SPT recommends that the Federal and State authorities assist the NPM in
its self-evaluation of its activities in order to ensure that it is exercising its mandate in
accordance with the Optional Protocol and the SPT Guidelines on national preventive
mechanisms.6 The SPT also recommends that the State Party take measures to ensure
and respect the financial and operational independence of the NPM, in accordance
with Article 18, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol.7
21.
The SPT underscores that according to the part IV of the Optional Protocol, the role
of the NPM is not to monitor existing monitoring mechanisms, but to exercise its own
mandate to strengthen the protection of persons deprived of their liberty from torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. At the same time, duplication
of work and tasks should be avoided in order to use the resources efficiently, as well as not
to send out mixed messages.
22.
The SPT recommends that whilst exercising its own visiting mandate, the NPM
cooperate with the other existing mechanisms which monitor places of deprivation of
liberty in order to seek possible synergies, including in the context of monitoring
houses for the elderly. The SPT in particular recommends that the Joint Commission
cooperate with the Municipal Supervisions of houses for the elderly as those
institutions have not so far (with rare exceptions) been visited by the NPM due to a
lack of adequate expertise.8
5
6
7
8
CAT/OP/12/5.
AT/OP/12/5, para. 15.
CAT/OP/12/5, para. 12.
CAT/OP/12/5, para. 10.
5