CAT/OP/MLT/1
16.
The SPT acknowledges the State party’s efforts in implementing its obligations
under the OPCAT and expresses its gratitude to the support provided prior to and during the
visit, which allowed it to meet with different stakeholders and monitor the implementation
of the mandate by the NPMs. The SPT notes that the NPMs are faced with several obstacles
hindering the full and effective implementation of their tasks, which this report will address
in the next chapter, together with recommendations to the State party.
17.
In accordance with its mandate, as set out in article 11 (b), subparagraphs (ii) and
(iii), the SPT will address a separate confidential report to the NPMs of Malta.
III. Main obstacles faced by the national preventive mechanisms
18.
While the State is free to determine the institutional format of the NPMs, it is
imperative that the NPM is fully compliant with the OPCAT, taking account of the NPM
Guidelines, and its functional and operational independence is guaranteed, taking account
of the Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (“the Paris Principles”).
19.
The SPT noted that the two Boards were designated as NPMs without due
consideration being given to the requirements and practical needs of the NPMs, and in
particular their preventive mandate. Therefore, there is a lack of understanding both among
the public authorities and the members of the NPMs themselves on the role and function of
a NPM, as well as of some key concepts, such as what is a preventive approach,
institutional independence, and the definition of places of deprivation of liberty provided by
the OPCAT and the NPM Guidelines.
20.
The SPT considers it to be essential that the NPMs, as a first priority, educate
their members concerning the role and functioning of NPMs under the OPCAT and
the Guidelines on national preventive mechanisms.
21.
The SPT notes that there are in the Republic of Malta a variety of bodies monitoring
places of deprivation of liberty, including, in addition to the two NPMs, public monitoring
bodies such as the Ombudsman, the Police Board, the Commissioner for Mental Health and
Older Persons and the Commissioner for Children. It notes with concern that not all places
of deprivation of liberty, as defined in the OPCAT, fall within the mandate of the NPMs
and that even taking into account of those public monitoring bodies that are not part of the
NPM, there are still significant monitoring gaps. At the same time, the overlaps between
bodies monitoring the same institutions could risk creating confusion and duplication of
work, as, for example, at the Mount Carmel Hospital which is visited by the two NPMs and
the Commissioner for Mental Health and Older Persons.
22.
The SPT also notes that there are significant variations in the mandate, powers and
functions, appointment processes, levels of state funding, and institutional arrangements of
the public monitoring bodies, including the two NPMs.
23.
The SPT recommends that the State party develop a full list of the types of
places where persons are deprived of their liberty, in accordance with the OPCAT
definition, and ensure all such places in the State party fall within the mandate of the
NPMs established in accordance with the OPCAT, the NPM Guidelines and the Paris
Principles.
24.
The SPT also recommends that the State party, first of all, sets out a clear and
coherent vision of its approach to torture prevention in order to determine the most
effective and efficient institutional structure for the prevention of torture in the
Republic of Malta. This should include a study of the best practices, challenges and
experiences of the various national monitoring bodies and clearly define the roles of
the NPMs, public authorities, civil society and international cooperation and how they
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