CAT/OP/HUN/2
10.
Since its establishment in 2015, the national preventive mechanism has carried out
15 visits to places of deprivation of liberty. 1 Due to the limited targeted budgetary support
available, the Commissioner had to allocate its own resources to preparatory work
concerning the performance of the national preventive mechanism’s tasks. The funds
concerned were made available by the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights
through the transformation and reorganization of office operations.2
11.
The Subcommittee was informed that, compared to 2015, the budget of the Office of
the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights has increased. However, there are no explicit
provisions in the regulating acts regarding the earmarking of funding for the national
preventive mechanism. The Subcommittee highlights the fact that the lack of budgetary
independence negatively affects the independent functioning of the mechanism.
12.
The Civic Consultative Body was established in 2014 for a period of three years to
provide advice to the national preventive mechanism. It is composed of representatives of
independent organizations, which are either invited to participate, as was the case for the
Hungarian Medical Chamber, the Hungarian Psychiatric Association, the Hungarian
Dietetic Association and the Hungarian Bar Association, or selected as a result of a public
call for interest, as was the case for the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the Hungarian Civil
Liberties Union, Menedék — Hungarian Association for Migrants and Validity (formerly
the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre). The Civic Consultative Body provides comments
and suggestions on the content of the mechanism’s annual schedule of visits, inspection
priorities, working methods, reports and other publications and the training plan for the
mechanism’s members.3
13.
The Subcommittee welcomes the fact that the national preventive mechanism has
been operational for over a year, has conducted several visits to places of deprivation of
liberty in Hungary and has published its first annual report.
III. Recommendations to the national preventive mechanism
A.
Recommendations relating to legal, institutional and structural issues
1.
Structure and independence
14.
As a general observation, the Subcommittee notes that the national preventive
mechanism does not have an identity distinct from that of the Office of the Commissioner
for Fundamental Rights, not only with respect to its legal framework but also to its
institutional framework and guarantees of independence. The Subcommittee is particularly
concerned at the lack of functional independence of the mechanism within the Office of the
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. While the Optional Protocol does not provide for a
mechanism structure that is compliant with its provisions, it is imperative that the
mechanism should be able to carry out its mandate in accordance with the principles of the
Optional Protocol, as reflected in the Subcommittee’s guidelines on national preventive
mechanisms.
15.
Even though the decision concerning the institutional format of the national
preventive mechanism is left to States parties’ discretion, it is imperative that the legal acts
regulating the work of the mechanism should comply fully with the Optional Protocol, the
Subcommittee’s guidelines on national preventive mechanisms, the principles relating to
the status of national institutions (the Paris Principles) and the compilation of advice
provided by the Subcommittee in response to requests from national preventive
mechanisms (see CAT/C/57/4, annex).
1
2
3
4
Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, Comprehensive Annual Report of the
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights on the Activities of the OPCAT National Preventive
Mechanism in 2015 (Budapest, May 2016), p. 35, sect. 8.
Ibid., p. 16, sect. 2.4.
Ibid., p. 20, sect. 4.2.