FACTSHEET
the right to privacy needs to be safeguarded when
detainees use the toilets, showers and wash basins.
Detainees should be clearly informed about what is
recorded by CCTV in the cell (eg. the toilet area may in
fact appear blurred on the screen but detainees may
not be informed of this by the police). Some monitoring
bodies have argued for the removal of ‘blind spots’
in CCTV coverage, such as the toilet area, in order to
prevent suicides. At the same time, prevention of such
risks has to be constantly weighed against the protection
of detainees’ dignity. Authorities sometimes argue that
CCTV in toilet areas is needed to stop detainees from
flushing drugs away.
To ensure confidential and privileged communications,
places where meetings with lawyers as well as medical
examinations take place should not be video- recorded.
The legitimacy of video recording other specific
locations on police premises is also subject to debate.
For example, CCTV may appear to safeguard against
abuse in rooms where strip searches take place, but at
the same time, due consideration should be given to
the protection of a person’s privacy and dignity.7 CCTV
recording of cells to purposely prevent suicide attempts
should not replace staff physically checking the situation
of the persons concerned on a regular basis.
Where police stations have so-called ‘sobering-up cells’,
video-recording may also be two-edged. On the one
hand, it can help prevent incidents or even deaths; on
the other, the use of CCTV in such situations can infringe
the right to privacy of a person who is not only in a
position of vulnerability, but in most cases not being held
in the police station for having committed an offence. In
any case, a regular round by police officers will be more
effective at preventing incidents than CCTV monitoring
alone, as images never fully reflect what is happening in
the place being recorded.
[A]lthough the CCTV surveillance of the
“
rooms at the stations improves the safety of
persons staying therein and helps prevent
extraordinary incidents, it also limits the
constitutionally protected right to privacy,
which may be limited only by means of an
act of law. 8
”
(Polish National Preventive Mechanism)
To protect detainees’ right to privacy it is also important
that any video screen transmitting images is not visible to
members of the general public entering the police station
or to persons being processed (ie. if monitoring screens
are located at reception, they should be hidden from
public view).
In order to protect those in custody as well as police
officers from false allegations of ill-treatment, it is
crucial that video cameras are placed in rooms where
interrogations take place and that there should be no
‘blind spots’ where abuse can take place unrecorded.
If there is only one camera in the room, it should be
possible to rotate it or to increase the viewing field so
that the camera provides an image of the entire room,
and of all persons present at the time of the interrogation.
There is a risk that threatening gestures towards the
person being interrogated go unnoticed if the camera is
fixed and its field does not cover the entire room.9 It is
also crucial that the quality of the image is good enough
to ensure that persons filmed can be identified.
Lastly, when forced deportations of rejected asylum
seekers are carried out by law enforcement agencies,
video-recording can contribute to preventing abuse, as
recommended by the CPT:10
Deportation operations must be carefully
“
documented. […] Other means, for instance
audiovisual, may also be envisaged, and
are used in some of the countries visited,
in particular for deportations expected to
be problematic. In addition, surveillance
cameras could be installed in various areas
(corridors providing access to cells, route
taken by the escort and the deportee to
the vehicle used for transfer to the aircraft,
etc.).
”
What could monitoring bodies check?
• Which areas are monitored by CCTV? Is any area
outside the police station also monitored by CCTV
(such as police vehicles or police operations)?
• Are cells for ‘sobering-up’ monitored by CCTV?
• Is the CCTV equipment well-functioning?
7. This is the view of the French Inspector of places of deprivation of liberty. See visit report to Niort police station, 22-23 March 2011. Available at: http://
www.cglpl. fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Rapport-de-visite-du-commissariat-de-police-de-Niort.pdf <accessed 23 October 2013>. The institution in
charge of preventing torture in Catalonia (Spain) is of a different view and has recommended installing video-cameras in all rooms where strip searches
take place. See Informe de la autoridad catalana de prevención de la tortura 2012, p85. Available at: http://www.sindic.cat/site/unitFiles/3392/
Informe%20ACPT%202012%20castellano.pdf <accessed 23 October 2013>.
8. See Report of the Human Rights Defender (OMBUDSMAN) on the activities of the National Preventive Mechanism in Poland in 2012. Available at:
http://www. rpo.gov.pl/en/content/reports-national-preventive-mechanism <accessed 23 October 2013>.
9. See, for example, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) report on its visit to Turkey in 2009, CPT/Inf (2011) 13, para. 33, p22.
10. See the CPT’s13th General Report, [CPT / Inf (2003) 35], p18, para. 44. See also CPT’s visit to Finland in 2008, [CPT/Inf (2009) 5], para. 57, p29.
Penal Reform International | Video recording in police custody: Addressing risk factors to prevent torture and ill-treatment
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