CCPR/C/132/D/3105/2018
an effective defense by the accused and their counsel.14 However, the right of the accused to
obtain the examination of witnesses on his or her behalf is not absolute. It is only a right to
have witnesses admitted that are relevant for the defence and to be given a proper opportunity
to question and challenge witnesses against them at some stage of the proceedings. 15
8.5
In the present case, the Committee notes that the submissions from the author,
including those regarding the initial sentence and verdict, reveal that all of the experts that
provided multiple examination results, including in reports dated 22 March 2016 (DNA
analysis), 4 April 2016 (autopsy results) and 16 May 2016 (blood spot analysis), were not
called to testify in court and that, therefore, counsel for the author’s son were unable to
question or cross-examine them. The Committee notes that the State party does not provide
pertinent explanations for the unavailability during the court hearings of the expert witnesses,
who provided important forensic information. The Committee therefore considers that, in the
circumstances of the present case, and in the absence of pertinent explanations from the State
party, the State party violated the rights of the author’s son under article 14 (3) (e). 16
8.6
The Committee notes the statement by the State party that the death penalty is not
prohibited when imposed for the most serious crimes (see para. 4.6 above). This is provided
for in article 6 (2) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that the term “the most serious
crimes” must be read restrictively and appertain only to crimes of extreme gravity involving
intentional killing.17 The author’s son was sentenced to death after a conviction for murder,
which qualifies as a most serious crime. However, the Covenant also provides that stringent
fair trial requirements must be met before the death penalty may be imposed, to comply with
article 6 of the Covenant.18
8.7
The author claims that his son’s right to life, protected under article 6 of the Covenant,
was violated, since he was sentenced to death after an unfair trial. In that respect, the
Committee recalls its jurisprudence, according to which the imposition of a sentence of death
upon the conclusion of a trial in which the provisions of article 14 of the Covenant have not
been respected constitutes a violation of article 6 of the Covenant.19 The Committee recalls
that, in cases of trials leading to the imposition of the death penalty, scrupulous respect of the
guarantees of fair trial is particularly important.20 In addition, the Committee also recalls that
violation of the fair trial guarantees provided for in article 14 of the Covenant in proceedings
resulting in the imposition of the death penalty would render the sentence arbitrary in nature,
and in violation of article 6 of the Covenant. Such violations might involve failure to respect
the presumption of innocence, which may manifest itself in the accused being placed in a
cage or handcuffed during the trial.21 In the light of the Committee’s findings of a violation
of article 14 (2) and (3) (e) of the Covenant, with respect to the failure to respect the
presumption of innocence and the inability of the author’s son to cross-examine expert
witnesses, the Committee concludes that the final sentence of death and the subsequent
execution of the author’s son did not meet the requirements of article 14 and that, as a result,
his right to life under article 6 of the Covenant was also violated.
9.
The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that
the facts before it disclose a violation by the State party of the rights of the author’s son under
articles 6, 9 (3) and 14 (2) and (3) (e) of the Covenant. The Committee also concludes that,
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
8
General comment No. 32 (2007).
See Allaberdiev v. Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/119/D/2555/2015), para. 8.8.
See also Dugin v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/81/D/815/1998), para. 9.3; and Rouse v. Philippines
(CCPR/C/84/D/1089/2002), para. 7.5.
General comment No. 36 (2018), para. 35.
Ibid., para. 41.
General comment No. 32 (2007), para. 59. See also Levy v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/64/D/719/1996), para.
7.3; Kurbanova v. Tajikistan (CCPR/C/79/D/1096/2002), para. 7.7; Shukurova v. Tajikistan
(CCPR/C/86/D/1044/2002), para. 8.6; Idieva v. Tajikistan, para. 9.7; Khoroshenko v. Russian
Federation (CCPR/C/101/D/1304/2004), para. 9.11; Gunan v. Kyrgyzstan
(CCPR/C/102/D/1545/2007), para. 6.5; and Grunov and Grunova v. Belarus
(CCPR/C/123/D/2375/2014-CCPR/C/123/D/2690/2015), para. 8.6.
General comment No. 32 (2007), para. 59.
General comment No. 36 (2018), para. 41.