CAT/C/21/D/110/1998
page 4
The complaint
3.1
The author maintained that her forced return to Peru would place her in
danger of being subjected to torture. Such a situation had to be borne in
mind, particularly in the context of the existence in Peru of a consistent
pattern of violations of human rights, an aspect of which was the frequent use
of torture against persons accused of belonging to insurgent organizations, as
noted by United Nations bodies, the Organization of American States and
non-governmental organizations. The author therefore asked the Committee to
request the State party to refrain from carrying out her forced return to Peru
while her communication was being considered by the Committee.
3.2
She also maintained that, if she was extradited, proceedings would be
brought against her that would not guarantee the fundamental principles of due
process, since serious irregularities were committed every day in Peru during
the trial of persons accused of belonging to an insurgent organization. Such
irregularities were contrary to the provisions of the international human
rights instruments ratified by Peru and by the State party.
Observations by the State party
4.1
Through its Special Rapporteur on New Communications, the Committee
transmitted the communication to the State party on 11 May 1998, requesting it
to submit its observations on the admissibility and, if it did not object
thereto, on the merits of the communication. It also requested the State
party to refrain from expelling or extraditing the author while her
communication was being considered by the Committee.
4.2
On 2 July 1998, the State party informed the Committee that the
Supreme Court's decision had been adopted in accordance with domestic
legislation, particularly the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure,
and the 1928 Convention on Private International Law, to which Peru and
Venezuela were parties. The activities attributed to the author, namely,
involvement in manufacturing and planting car bombs for later attacks which
killed and wounded a large number of people, constituted a serious ordinary
offence, not a political offence. The State party also indicated that the
defence had not provided any factual evidence to indicate whether or not
article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture was applicable. The
statements by witnesses who accused the author and whom the defence claimed
had been subjected to torture had been made without any coercion, as shown by
the fact that they had been given in the presence of representatives of the
Public Prosecutor's Department and the defence lawyers.
Comments by the author
5.1
In her comments on the observations by the State party, the author
maintained that the extradition took place even though legal remedies had not
been exhausted, at the time when the Supreme Court was considering an
application for amparo with a request for precautionary measures against the
decision granting extradition. The extradition took place on 3 July and only
on 7 July 1998 did the Court rule on the application for amparo, declaring it