–4–
72.
In some of the above-mentioned countries, steps have been taken in recent years by the
prison authorities to alleviate the detention conditions of life-sentenced prisoners, in particular, by
offering the prisoners work and other purposeful activities (including more association with other
life-sentenced prisoners) and by following a more individualised approach when it comes to the
imposition of security measures. However, much remains to be done to render the situation
satisfactory. Regrettably, policies regarding the execution of sentences are still all too often based
on the presumption that life-sentenced prisoners are by definition particularly dangerous and that
the regime applied to such prisoners should in one way or another also have a punitive character.
The CPT wishes to stress once again that there can be no justification for the systematic
handcuffing or strip-searching of prisoners, all the more so when it is applied in an already secure
environment. The Committee has also repeatedly stated that the use of dogs inside the detention
area is unacceptable. In this connection, the Committee wishes to emphasise that the experience in
various European countries has shown that life-sentenced prisoners are not necessarily more
dangerous than other prisoners (see also paragraph 76). Further, as a matter of fact, life-sentenced
prisoners – as indeed all prisoners – are sent to prison as a punishment and not to receive
punishment.
“Life means life”
73.
As indicated above, in several Council of Europe member states, a person may be sentenced
to life imprisonment without any prospect of conditional release. This is known as an “actual or
whole life sentence”. The CPT has criticised the very principle of such sentences in several visit
reports, expressing serious reservations regarding the fact that a person sentenced to life
imprisonment is considered once and for all to be dangerous and is deprived of any hope of
conditional release (except on compassionate grounds or by pardon). The Committee maintains that
to incarcerate a person for life without any real prospect of release is, in its view, inhuman. It is also
noteworthy that even persons who are convicted by the International Criminal Court (or special
international tribunals) of the most serious crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity may in principle benefit at a certain stage from conditional (early) release.
Indeed, the CPT considers that a prison sentence which offers no possibility of release
precludes one of the essential justifications of imprisonment itself, the possibility of rehabilitation.
While punishment and public protection are important elements of a prison sentence, excluding
from the outset any hope of rehabilitation and return to the community effectively dehumanises the
prisoner. This is not to say that all life-sentenced prisoners should be released sooner or later; public
protection is a crucial issue. However, all such sentences should be subject to a meaningful review
at some stage, based on individualised sentence-planning objectives defined at the outset of the
sentence, and reviewed regularly thereafter. This would provide not only hope for the prisoner, but
also a target to aim for which should motivate positive behaviour. It would thus also assist prison
administrations in dealing with individuals who would otherwise have no hope and nothing to lose.
The European Court of Human Rights has in recent years examined a number of cases
where domestic courts had imposed life sentences on prisoners with no possibility for early or
conditional release and where, barring compassionate or highly exceptional circumstances, a whole
life sentence meant precisely that. The most authoritative judgment of the Court to date, delivered
by the Grand Chamber in Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom,6 states that it was incompatible
with human dignity, and therefore contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, for a state to deprive a person of their freedom without at least giving them a chance one
day to regain that freedom.
6
See Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013.